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COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
R O RT W. FOsTER*
The title of this section is new to the Annual Survey issue.
It covers such traditional divisions of the law as sales, commer-
cial paper (bills and notes), and chattel security. This combi-
nation is thought to be a more functional one when a commer-
cial transaction is defined as the sale of and payment for goods.
This process may involve a number of facets. There may be a
sales contract, the giving of a check for part of the purchase
price which may be negotiated and ultimately pass through
banks for collection, and the acceptance of some form of secur-
ity to insure the payment of the balance as evidenced by a
promissory note. Frictions which develop between the parties
calling for legal solutions will be treated within the scope of this
single subject of the law.'
I. SALES
The three cases decided in the sales area all dealt with the fre-
quently litigated matter of warranty obligations. J. T. Herndon
v. Southern, Pest Control Co.-2 was originally tried in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina
to recover damages for the loss of a number of pigs from "TGE,"
a disease which plaintiff alleged was caused by an insecticide
purchased from the defendant under an express warranty that it
would kill flies without harming his pigs. On the factual ques-
tion of the causal connection between the use of the insecticide
and the death of the pigs, the plaintiff presented evidence to
show that shortly after its use the mortality rate increased several
times over that normally expected, and returned to normal when
he discontinued its use. In addition, the plaintiff's veterinarian
testified that after performing fifty autopsies on the dead pigs,
he was of the definite opinion that they had died from the con-
tinued inhalation of the insecticide. At the conclusion of the
plaintiff's evidence, the district judge directed a verdict for the
defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina
1. This concept is the basic approach of the Uniform Commercial Code, now
enacted in 28 states and presently being considered in South Carolina by a
Legislative Study Committee. See summary treatment in Foster, The Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code 15 S.C.L. Rv. 623 (1963). In the discussion of the
cases which follow, reference will be made to points covered by the Uniform
Commercial Code.
2. 307 F2d 753 (4th Cir. 1962).
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plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to make out a prima facie case
and he was thus entitled to go to the jury.
The principal cases on which the district court judge and the
appellees had relied in support of the view that the plaintiff's
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law were Thomas v.
Kasoo Mills, Inc.3 and Ralston Pu rina Co. v. Edmunds.4 Both
of these cases dealt with the sufficiency of evidence of the al-
leged defects in the quality of turkey feed which it was claimed
caused nutritional deficiency and disturbance of the turkey's re-
productive processes, thus substantially reducing the expected
growth of the flocks. In both cases the turkey growers adduced
evidence of unsatisfactory results during the time period when
the feed in question was being used and expert witnesses testified
that there was a possibility that the feed could have caused the
trouble. In these cases, the Court of Appeals held, as a matter
of law, that the evidence was insufficient to make out a prima
facie case of causual relationship between the use of the feed
and the disappointing results.
While this writer does not profess any expert knowledge of
the sex life and the feeding habits of a turkey, it would seeir
that disturbances in their reproductive processes, if not neceo
sarily invoking greater sympathy than the death of a hog, would
be more difficult of definite proof. The expert witnesses in the
turkey cases were thus necessarily equivocal while the expert
opinion in the Herndon case on the relationship between the
use of the defendant's product and the death of the pigs was
more definite. This seems to be the court's principal basis of
distinguishing the cases without disturbing the standard of a
probable relationship between the claimed cause and the results
complained of in order to resist a directed verdict in a breach of
warranty suit brought in the federal courts.5 In its application
to cases such as those discussed above, the practical effect seems
to be that the plaintiff who brings his action in the federal court
will not be able to go to the jury on the question of causal con-
nection when there is more than one possible cause for the dam-
ages.
3. 218 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1955).
4. 241 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1957).
5. The standard of proof necessary may be less stringent when the case is
brought in the state courts of South Carolina. See Spartanburg Hotel Corp.
v. Alexander Smith, Inc., 231 S.C. 1, 97 S.E.2d 199 (1957); Patterson v.
Orangeburg Fertilizer Co., 117 S.C. 140, 108 S.E. 401 (1921).
[Vol. 16
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Durant v. Palmetto Chevrolet Co.8 was an action for breach
of an oral express warranty of the defendant automobile dealer
covering defects in material and workmanship of an automobile
purchased by the plaintiff for a period of one year or 12,000
miles. The principal defense asserted by defendant was that the
written express warranty contained in a separate document sup-
plied by the manufacturer and delivered to the plaintiff at the
time of the sale was limited to 90 days or 4,000 mlies, was express-
ly in lieu of all other warranties, and thus precluded proof of the
broader oral warranty. In support of its argument for a directed
verdict and the exclusion of the oral warranty, the defendant
relied on the case of Sanders v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.7 where
the purchaser of a combine sought to recover from the manu-
facturer on an oral warranty based on statements made by the
defendant's dealer. An express written warranty was incorpor-
ated in the sales contract which excluded all other warranties.
The court held that the written warranty ran to the purchaser
and that oral representations made at the time of the sale were
superseded by the contract in writing and, therefore, inadmis-
sible for the purpose of varying the terms of the written agree-
ment. In the Durant case, the court did not dispute the general
proposition that a written expressed warranty, which disclaimed
all other warranties, would be given effect to prevent the proof
of inconsistent oral warranties. In affirming the lower court's
admission of parol evidence to show the oral warranty made by
the dealer, the court refused to apply the above principle on the
ground that it was incumbent upon the defendant to establish
that the restrictive written warranty was called to the plaintiff's
attention at the time of the sale.
The policy of freedom of contract generally supports the right
of a seller to expressly disclaim warranty obligations. Further-
more, the policy objective of safeguarding commercial trans-
actions and the stability of written contracts is expressed by the
parol evidence rule and by the generally recognized duty imposed
on a contracting party to know the contents of a written contract
to which he is a party.8 Occasionally a court is faced with the
holding the seller to oral assurances concerning the quality of
the goods which induced the contract to buy. Such was the posi-
conflicting policy objective of protecting a buyer of goods by
6. 241 S.C. 508, 129 S.E. 2d 323 (1963).
7. 237 S.C. 133, 115 S.E.2d 793 (1960).
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tion of the South Carolina Supreme Court in the Durant case.
In selecting the latter objective over the former, the court had
ample authority to sustain its conclusion that in order for a
writing to limit warranty obligations to its express written terms,
it must be brought to the attention of the buyer." Furthermore,
the court may have been able to distinguish the Durant case from
the earlier Sanders case on the ground that in the latter the re-
strictive, express written language which served to preclude the
oral assertions made by the seller was set out in the contract
which the buyer signed, while in the Durant case the writing
was a separate document given to the buyer with the signed sales
contract.
Apart from such judicial rationale as the express basis of the
decision, the result is undoubtedly an implicit reflection of ju-
dicial disfavor of contractual disclaimers and restrictions on war-
ranty obligations, especially where the seller drafts a standard-
ized contract of adhesion which he is able to impose on buyers
who occupy a grossly unequal bargaining position.10 The point
at which the court will forego principles of freedom of contract
and refuse to hold a buyer of goods to the disclaimer of war-
ranties term of a written contract in the future is necessarily un-
certain. Recognizing that freedom of contract does not mean free-
dom to deceive, recent cases and statutes in other jurisdictions
have, with increasing frequency, adopted the standard of "un-
conscionable" as the point at which contractual disclaimers will
not be enforced.11 The seller of goods may still protect himself
against false allegations of oral warranties and even over-enthusi-
astic affirmations of fact concerning the goods at the time of the
sale by the use of an intergrated written contract which con-
spicuously sets out a disclaimer of warranty obligations, and
which conveys to the buyer the risks he is required to assume. He
may find it more difficult to accomplish this by unexpected and
unbargained for language.
9. E.g., Stevenson v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 176 S.C. 345, 180 S.E. 197
(1935) ; Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E.2d
53 (1948).
10. The form warranty involved in the Durant case has been used in the
past by the vast majority of automobile manufacturers. See AUTOMOBILE FAcTs
AND FIGUREs 69 (1958).
11. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., & Chrysler Corp., 32 NJ.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1959); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, "If the Court
as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract . . . ." Also see, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 on the
exclusion and modification of warranties.
[Vol. 16
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An application of the general rule that a buyer waives the right
to assert a breach of warranty of quality when he accepts de-
fective goods where the defect was apparent and was, or could
have been, discovered by reasonable examination, was involved in
Johnson Cotton Co. v. Cannon.12 The testimony in that case in-
dicated that the buyer of irri ation equipment knew that it was
defective within a week after its delivery and yet executed a note
secured by a conditional sales contract for the unpaid purchase
price thirty-six days thereafter. The defendant testified that he
notified the seller of his objection to the operation of the equip-
ment several times prior to the execution of the conditional sales
contract, and that the seller made several attempts to remedy
the defect. The court affirmed a directed verdict for the plain-
tiff-seller rejecting the argument that the question should have
gone to the jury to determine whether the defendant-buyer had
waived his right to rely on breach of warranty.
There is abundant authority in South Carolina, 3 as well as
other jurisdictions,14 to support the general rule of waiver of
breach of warranty on which the Cannon case was based. Fur-
thermore, the conclusion that there is a waiver of the right to ob-
ject when the buyer, with knowledge of the defect, executes an
agreement to pay the purchase price, has ample support.15 On
the other hand, these general propositions do not automatically
apply as a matter of law in all cases where there is an acceptance
of goods with actual knowledge of their defective condition.
Payment for goods received while constantly demanding full
performance, does not justify an inference of waiver of rights,'6
particularly where necessity compels such acceptance. Rights
are not waived where a person is led by promises of settlement or
adjustment.' 7 There is a wide factual area within which the
question of waiver of right must be submitted to the jury.'8
The court's conclusions that as a matter of law the Cannon
case was beyond the area of jury determination was based pri-
12. 242 S.C. 42, 129 S.E2d 750 (1963).
13. Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E.2d 653
(1948); Monroe v. Wood, 186 S.C. 507, 197 S.E. 39 (1938).
14. UNIFORM SAILs ACT § 15(3) and 49; UNIFoni COMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-607(2).
15. Rouse Hempston & Co. v. Sarratt, 74 S.C. 575, 54 S.E. 757 (1906);
Sullivan v. Huff, 24 S.C. 348 (1885).
16. Griffith v. Newell, 69 S.C. 300, 48 S.E. 259 (1904).
17. Empire Buggy Co. v. Moss, 154 S.C. 424, 153 S.E. 788 (1930).
18. Southern Brick Co. v. McDaniel, 187 S. C. 243, 196 S.E. 893 (1938);





Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTir CA IoLinA L w REvmw
marily on the fact that the buyer did not register any objection
at the time he executed the note and security instrument for the
purchase price of the goods purchased.
II. CHATTEL SECURITY
In addition to the issue of waiver of breach of warranty dis-
cussed under the sales heading, the defendant in Johnson Cotton
Co. v. Cannon, appealed from a directed verdict for plaintiff to
recover a deficiency judgment after repossession and resale. The
position of the defendant was that the plaintiff had waived its
claim for any deficiency judgment on the ground that public
notice was given only fourteen days prior to the sale in violation
of the statutory requirement of at least fifteen days notice prior
to a valid public sale. 19 In affirming the lower court's judgment,
the court held that since the defendant had actual notice and
ample opportunity to be present at the sale, he had not been pre-
judiced and thus may not now complain of any defects in the
statutory notice requirements.
It has long been recognized that a repossessing conditional sales
vendor after reselling, may recover from the purchaser any re-
sulting deficiency,20 but only where there has been a proper re-
sale, that is, in accordance with the terms of the statute.21 The
South Carolina statutory prescription for a valid public sale is
similar to those found in other jurisdictions, including the time
for giving notice, and is designed to protect the interest of the
debtor by insisting that a fair purchase price be paid.22 The
court in the Cannon case gave a practical interpretation to the
statute in view of its purpose and read into it a qualification
that the debtor must show some prejudice resulting from a tech-
nical non-compliance affecting the fairness of the price paid as a
condition of complaint. This result seems to be in line with the
early South Carolina case law, 23 the modern trend of decisions, 24
and recent statutory treatment in other jurisdictions. 25 Greater
19. S.C. CODE § 45-164 (1962).
20. Straub v. Screven, 19 S.C. 445 (1883).
21. National Exch. Bank v. Holman, 31 S.C. 161, 9 S.E. 824 (1888).
22. Cf. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES Acr § 19 requiring "not less than ten
days' written notice."
23. Dornall & Susong v. Darlington, 28 S.C. 255; 5 S.E. 620 (1887);
National Exch. Bank v. Holman, 31 S.C. 161, 9 S.E. 824 (1888).
24. Bulldog Concrete Forms Sales Corp. v. Taylor (7th Cir. 1952).
25. UNFoR COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504, "Sale . . . must be commercially
reasonable . . . reasonable notification, of the time and place of any public
sale . . ."
[Vol. 16
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flexibility in the procedure for disposing of repossessed chattels
will often make it possible to get more money for the collateral
disposed of provided the secured party acts in a commercially
reasonable manner.
In a mortgage foreclosure action commenced by claim and de-
livery, the defendant mortgagor counter-claimed for punitive
damages for conversion alleging that the plaintiff in a wilful
manner caused a boat trailer which the defendant owned to be
taken from his possession. Evidence at the trial showed that the
plaintiff had made a substitution on its books of the serial num-
ber of the trailer taken for a similar one on which it held a
chattel mortgage when it could not be found on defendant's
premises. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the de-
fendant had authorized the substitution. The trial judge set
aside the jury verdict for punitive damages which was affirmed
on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support a
reasonable inference of "fraud, wilfulness, reckless or conscious
disregard of appellant's rights.126
While it is well established that upon default of a secured
debt the chattel mortgagee has an alternative remedy to com-
mence foreclosure proceedings by bringing an action for claim
and delivery,27 but he is exposed to an action for conversion when
he causes unencumbranced goods to be taken from the debtor.
In such a situation, of course, the usual prerequisite for the estab-
lishment of punitive damages in a conversion action applies; i.e.,
something more than negligence and variously described by the
courts as malice, ill will, a conscious indifference to the rights
of others, and the like.28 It seemed clear from the record of this
case that while the plaintiff may have been guilty of technical
conversion of the defendant's property, there was no evidence of
such conduct which would justify an award of punitive damages.
Haverty Furniture Co. v. TVortky,29 raised a priority question
between a lien under a conditional sales contract and a landlord's
lien for rent where the landlord had actual notice of the unre-
corded conditional sales contract at the time he filed a distress
for rent against the property. The appeal was based on the re-
26. South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Florence Sporting Goods, 241 S.C. 110,
127 S.E.2d 199 (1962).
27. Stokes v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 130 S.C. 513, 126 S.E.
649 (1924).
28. Cox v. Coleman, 189 S.C 218, 200 S.E. 762 (1938); Sample v. Gulf
Refining Co., 183 S.C. 399, 199 S.E. 209 (1936).
29. 241 S.C. 369, 128 S.E.2d 707 (1962). This case is also noted in the
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fusal to grant a motion to strike from the complaint the alle-
gation of actual notice on the ground that this was irrelevant in
determining priority. In affirming, the court relied on Section
41-155 of the 1962 Code, which provides in part: "And if the
landlord have actual notice of any unpaid purchase money lien,
such lien shall have priority to his claim for rent in the same
manner as above provided for certain chattel mortgages," and
concluded that the term "purchase money lien" was synonomous
with the conditional sales contract.
Priority problems between landlords and holders of a security
interest in the tenant's chattel on leased premises have been the
subject of considerable uncertainty and litigation in South Caro-
lina.30 The result in the Hlaverty Furniture Co. case is consistent
with the usual rule that actual knowledge of a security interest
is a substitute for recording.31 Whether such will be the case
where the landlord has notice of an unrecorded security instru-
ment other than a purchase money lien remains an open question.
III. COMIMERCIAL PAPER
Southern Frozen Foods, Inc. v. HiZZ32 was a suit on two pro-
missory notes executed by the only stockholders of a corporation,
given to the plaintiff in payment of the debts of the corporation's
predecessor in business, but made payable to a bank. (Apparently
this was the form requested by the plaintiff in anticipation of
discounting the note with the bank.) The first point raised by
the defendants by way of a motion for directed verdict was that
the plaintiff who was not named as payee and whose name does
not otherwise appear on the note as an indorsee, failed to show
any interest in the note. In rejecting this assertion, the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff was a holder of a bearer instrument.
The court quoted from the Negotiable Instruments Law which
defines an instrument payable to bearer as, "When it is payable
to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting person and such fact
was known to the person making it so payable,"
33 and concluded
30. E.g., Simpson v. McDonald, 79 S.C. 277, 60 S.E. 674 (1907) reversed
by Fidelity Trust & Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 158 S.C. 400, 155 S.E. 622 (1930)
and restored in part by U.S. Hoffman Machinery Corp. v. Harris, 167 S.C.
443, 166 S.E. 163 (1932) and Mather-James Co. v. Wilson, 172 S. C. 387,
174 S.E. 265 (1933).
31. S.C. CODE § 60-101 (1962).
32. 241 S.C. 524, 129 S.E.2d 420 (1963). This case is also noted in the
Corporations section at note 31.
33. S.C. CODE § 8-820 (1962).
Vol. 16
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that since the defendants did not intend the named payees to
receive any beneficial interest, this was not order paper requiring
the indorsement of the named payee.
This is a well established interpretation of the quoted statutory
language based on the reasoning that the intent of the maker
determines the character of commercial paper and that "fictitious
person" does not necessarily mean a "nonexisting" person.34
In asserting an additional defense of lack of consideration, the
defendant raised the question of whether the pre-existing debt
of a corporation is valid consideration for the personal note of its
principal stockholders. There is no doubt under the Negotiable
Instruments Law that lack or failure of consideration is a de-
fense as between the immediate parties to a negotiable instru-
ment3" and that generally a pre-existing debt constitutes suf-
ficient consideration." In rejecting the defendant's argument
that they received no benefit and that there was no loss or de-
triment to the plaintiff by the execution of the note, the court
found that the note gave an extension of time within which to
pay the debt which was also sufficient consideration to the co-
defendant even though he had no direct interest in the debtor
company.
While this question in the case has been subject to a conflict in
other jurisdictions, and had not previously been passed on in this
state, South Carolina has joined the apparent majority of states
which have held that sufficient consideration exists by virtue
34. Bourne v. Maryland Cas. Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192 S.E. 605 (1937); Ellis
Weaving Mills v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 91 F.Supp. 943, af'd 184 F.2d
43 (4th Cir. 1950). An application of this rule has resulted in some surprising
and unexpected results. For example, when an employer relying on his fraudu-
lent employee to submit names of persons entitled to payment, receives the
name of a non-existent person whom he names as payee of a check, this is
said to be an order instrument since the drawer intends that the named payee
receive the beneficial interest. Thus, when the employee indorses in the name
of the payee and receives payment from the drawee bank, it has been held that
the bank may not debit the drawer's account having paid an order instrument
with a forged indorsement. Commonwealth v. Farmers Depositor's Bank of
Frankfort, 264 Ky. 839, 95 S.W.2d 793 (1936). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 3-304(k) would change this result, not through bearer-order analysis, but by
making the indorsement by the payee "effective," thus placing the loss on the
drawer-employer and not on the payee bank.
35. S.C. CcDE § 8-845 (1962) applied in Johnston v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, 229 S.C. 603, 93 S.E.2d 916 (1956).
36. S.C. CODE § 8-842 (1962). Applied in Stalmaker v. Tolbert, 121 S.C.
437, 114 S.E. 412 (1922). The present statute does not make a clear distinction
between "value," properly applied to the question of a holder in due consider-
ation and "consideration," applicable to a defense against a person who is not
a holder in due course. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-303, 3-408, make this
distinction in the interest of clarity but this would not change the result that a
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of the incidental benefit to the stockholder because of his re-
lationship with the corporation."
IV. LEGISLATION
The Motor Vehicle Certificates of Title Law8 was amended to
require the owner of a vehicle subject to a lien to deliver the
application for a Certificate of Title to the lien holder for for-
warding to the department which will then issue a new certifi-
cate with the lien interest noted and mail it to the lienholder.3
9
The obvious purpose of this change is to give the lienholder an
added degree of protection by enabling him to be assured that
his interest is protected by notation on the certificate,40 and by
giving the lienholder the physical possession of the certificate.
41
Another amendment to the Certificate of Title Law requires a
lienholder in possession of the Certificate of Title to execute a
release of his security interest within thirty days after satis-
faction of the security interest "in any event."'42 The prior law
imposed this duty on the lienholder "within ten days after de-
mand." This 1963 amendment also adds the provision that a
failure to comply with this section is a misdemeanor punishable
by fine of up to 100 dollars or imprisonment of not more than
30 days.
40
37. For a collection of the cases, see 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 151 (1955).
38. S.C. CODE § 46-150 (1962).
39. S.C. CODE §§ 46-150.13, 46-150.45 (1962). Prior law required the depart-
ment to mail the certificate to the owner.
40. Except as to certain statutory liens and a security interest created by a
dealer, S.C. CODE § 46-150.41 (1962), this is the only way that a lien interest
on a motor vehicle can be perfected as against creditors or subsequent trans-
ferrees. S.C. CcDE §§ 46-150.42, 46-150.43 (1962).
41. This does not afford complete protection since Clanton's Auto Auction
Sales, Inc. v. Harvin, 238 S.C. 352, 120 S.E.2d 237 (1961) and Clanton's
Auto Auction Sales, Inc. v. Young, 239 S.C. 250, 122 S.E.2d 640 (1961) held
that the lien holder in possession of the certificate of title may not assert his
interest against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee from a dealer who is
given possession of the vehicle with the apparent authority to sell.
42. S.C. CODE § 46-150.48 (1962).
43. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-404 requiring a secured party of
record to execute a "termination statement" after satisfaction of the debt
within ten days after demand. Refusal to comply results in liability to the
debtor for one hundred dollars plus any loss caused to the debtor.
[Vol. 16
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